When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits.
This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.
Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits are now applied towards the trailer fields declared in "Trailer" headers.

NOTE: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/08/9
NOTE: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/81857
NOTE: Fixed by: https://github.com/golang/go/commit/cbb0fb8b51cba866018b8a0fb4b5458f16c5c80b (go1.27.2)
NOTE: Fixed by: https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6e049521882c944afc1e519a83971ec421dc2974 (go1.26.9)